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Abstract
It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO.
The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it
fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach
to observed board behaviour and point to the problems even well-intended
boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening
executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information
about executives behaviour, and only infrequently have information about
the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We
analyse the nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline
and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we nd that
executives may become overly active to show their credentials; that the link
between bad performance and dismissal is weak; and that boards occasionally
dismiss competent executives.
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1 Introduction
The literature on CEO turnover often rests on an important assumption: bad perfor-
mance means a bad CEO. As a consequence, the problem a board of directors faces
seems relatively simple: in case of bad performance, the CEO should be replaced.1
It is, however, a recurrent nding that substantially worse performance hardly leads
to an increase in the chances of dismissal.2 To explain this tenuous relation between
weak performance and turnover, boards are often characterized as indolentand
as ine¤ective rubber stampersof top managements decisions.3 Such characteri-
zations typically invoke descriptions of cases and interviews with top management
and board members. We do not doubt the validity and accuracy of these case de-
scriptions. Rather, we want to argue that they point to a reality in which even
well-intended board members face thorny dilemmas rather than a simple problem
due to the need to balance the attainment of various goals and the availability of
scant information. As we will show, one important implication is that the inference
from bad performance to bad CEO becomes questionable. Also, the relationship be-
tween bad performance and dismissal becomes tenuous. Finally, our analysis sheds
light on the question to what extent excessive growthof an organization is a moral
1The assumption usually remains implicit by using phrases like dismising a CEO after poor
performanceand ring an incompetent CEOinterchangeably, see e.g., Borokhovich et al. (1996,
p. 340), and Weisbach (1988, p. 431). In other parts of the literature, the gist seems to be that
dismissal following bad performance is an unproblematic implication, see, e.g., Warner et al. (1988)
and Kaplan (1994).
2See, e.g., Brickleys (2003) discussion of the empirical research on turnover and performance.
3See Tirole (2006) for a survey of complaints.
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hazard problem hurting shareholders or a signalling device helping the board.
Mace (1971) provides a classic account of what the relationship between a board
of directors and top executives is about in reality.4 Directors lack time, knowledge
and information to have an active involvement in decision-making.5 As a result, the
board performs two functions. First, a board serves as some sort of discipline(p.
13). When making decisions, top executives take into account what they feel the
board would consider acceptable actions, solutions and explanations. The second
function a board performs is to decide whether to retain or replace a top executive.
However, it is a very di¢ cult task for a board to nd out whether the top executive
is doing a good job. The board often does not know the problems the company
is facing, nor the possible actions it can take or the results it may expect, and by
and large it depends on the company for information on these matters. Moreover,
directors seem to dislike upsetting amiable relations with the top executives. As a
result, the board only decides to replace an executive if bad (nancial) performance
has been apparent for a considerable time (pp. 2733).
Performance related pay is also used to direct executivesattention and e¤ort.
There is no denying that incentive pay may work well. There is, however, some
evidence that observed incentive pay schemes do not provide a strong relationship
between rm performance and pay6. In a recent study, Dittmann and Maug (forth-
coming, p. 1) conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in
the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts. One of the reasons may be
4Mace (1971) is based on interviews with executives and directors of American companies.
Lorsch and MacIver (1989), basing themselves on interviews held with directors of American com-
panies in the second half of the 1980s, and Stiles and Taylor (2001), using interviews with directors
of British companies conducted in the late 1990s, report ndings that are by and large consistent
with those of Mace (1971).
5Directors refers to outside directors. Mace (1971, pp. 125-127) argues that inside directors
depend too much on the CEO to perform a critical role.
6See, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990) for a well known example of this. For a contrary view,
see Hall and Liebman (1998).
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that, in the words of Bebchuk and Fried (2003, p. 72), managerial power and rent
extraction ... have an important inuence on the design of compensation packages.
This would imply that incentive pay is not a remedy to an agency problem, but part
of the problem itself.
In this paper we focus on the use of retention strategies as a means to discipline
and screen executives in an environment in which the board has limited information
about the outcomes of executives actions. Our analysis sheds light on observed
empire building; on the tenuous relationship between performance and dismissal;
and casts doubt on the assumption that bad performance results from bad CEOs.
It has become one of the mainstays of the literature on corporate governance
that executives will turn into empire builders if not reined in by some tight form of
governance. Excessive growth or excessive investment are two forms empire building
may take on. It is invariably argued that the construction of such empires reects
executiveshunger for status, power and prestige, see, e.g., Baumol (1959), Marris
(1964), Williamson (1974), and Jensen (1986). Empire building, then, stems from
di¤erences in preferences between board and executives in conjunction with lack of
observability, a typical moral hazard problem. Marris (1964, p. 102) adds that there
is a further reason for growth: When a man takes decisions leading to successful
expansion,...he has demonstrated his powers as a manager and deserves his reward.
So personal ability also becomes judged by achieved growth. Such signalling can
be useful to a board possessing only limited information on an executives ability.
How, then, does a board deal with a possible conict between soliciting information
and thwarting empire building? What is the nature of possible retention strategies?
How do they di¤er in the way they trade-o¤ the attainment of the goals of the
board?
To answer these questions, we use a simple two-period model, in which on behalf
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of a board, in each period an executive designs a projectand decides whether or
not to implement it. A project can be anything that is meant to have a substantial
impact on the company, e.g., restructuring, diversication, acquisition. The quality
of the project depends on the competence of the executive and on exogenous cir-
cumstances. The executive knows his competence, but the board does not. When
making the implementation decision, the executive observes the exogenous circum-
stances, but the board does not. The board observes the implementation decision.
It learns the quality of the project only when it is implemented and then only with
a probability. Once the executive has made the implementation decision in the rst
period, the board can choose between keeping the executive and replacing him.
An important feature of our model is that a competent executive is more likely
to implement a project than a less competent one. The reason is that on average
a competent executive designs better projects, i.e. projects that are protable in
more adverse circumstances. Activism signals competence. The implication of this
feature is that activism can be used as a screening device. As a result, the board
sometimes wants a competent executive to implement projects that are not desirable
per se. Moreover, the board wants incompetent executives sometimes to abstain
from implementing desirable projects. The consequence is that the relationship
between bad performance and low quality executive is weakened.
Having established the screening function of the implementation decision, we
then show that an executives desire to keep his job (because of prestige, power,
remuneration, etc.) may lead him to exploit this function, and to distort the imple-
mentation decision. The executive may partially base the implementation decision
on the consequences this decision has for his career. The more the executive is
moved by prestige and power, the more he is willing to distort the implementation
decision to build an empire. That is, by using the implementation decision as a
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screening device, the board creates a moral-hazard problem. The board may reduce
this problem by dismissing an executive who has been found to have implemented
too bad a project. However, the signalling function of the implementation decision
implies that undesirable projects are implemented by competent executives in par-
ticular. As a result, a board will nd it di¢ cult to knowingly dismiss a competent
executive and replace him by one of unknown quality. To overcome this problem, a
board may have to stick to a norm or rule. If this is the case, dismissals stemming
from bad performance will often be considered regrettable yet inevitable.
The board should also decide what to do when it does not learn the quality of an
implemented project. Again, it is on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, it
could stick to a no news is good newsnorm, meaning that the executive is retained
in the absence of denite information on the value of the implemented project. This
would increase the probability that in period 2 a project will be designed by a
competent executive (after all, competent executives are more likely to implement
than incompetent ones). But it would also strengthen the incentive for the executive
in period 1 to distort the project implementation decision. In case the board were
to follow a no news is bad newsnorm, implying the executive has to leave in the
absence of information, the reverse holds. We show that a no news is good news
norm is preferable, ceteris paribus, if an executive does not care too much about
power, if the likelihood that a replacement is highly competent is small, and if the
di¤erence in competence between executives is large.
An important insight of our analysis, then, is that boards in order to address
the two main tasks they face, may have to stick to a norm to overcome a time
inconsistency problem.7 In particular, under some conditions the board wants to
7Lorsch and MacIver (1989) discuss how board room norms determine the e¤ectiveness with
which boards can perform their tasks.
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commit itself to a retention norm that may induce it to dismiss an executive who
is likely to be competent. Ex ante such a norm may be optimal as it discourages
executives to distort the implementation decision too much to signal competence.
Though perhaps surprising from a theoretical point of view, our result seems em-
pirically relevant. Consider Van der Hoeven, the former CEO of Ahold. In the ten
years he had been at the helm at Ahold, the company quickly expands through
a corporate acquisition strategy. As a result, Ahold had been hailed as the best
Dutch company for 5 consecutive years by 2002, notably for its consistent growth
and strategy. Van der Hoeven himself had been elected manager of the year in
2001 and 2002, praised for his strategic insight and entrepreneurship.8 He had to
resign in the wake of the bookkeeping fraud at Aholds daughter US Foodservices
in 2003. Further judicial inquiries later showed that Aholds stake in companies in
Sweden, Argentina, and Chile had been exaggerated with a view to inating rev-
enues and prots. Similarly, Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of MCI Worldcom,
received awards for his leadership from, among others, Business Week, Financial
World, Wired and Time Magazine in the late 1990s and in 2000. As Van der Ho-
even, he had grown the business by going on a buying spree. He was dismissed in
2002 following serious concerns about the companys nances and accounting prac-
tices. It could be argued that fraudulent practices and judicial probes led to their
dismissal, not a negative decision of the board following observed bad results. How-
ever, the fraudulent practices were meant to paint too rosy a picture of the situation
either company found itself in. This suggests that both executives were aware that
had the real results of their corporate acquisition activities become known dismissal
by the board would have been likely.
8See Management Team, issues 17 of 2001 and 2002. This Dutch magazine publishes the results
of a questionnaire held among 400 Dutch managers.
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The trade-o¤ between disciplining and screening is also felt in the relationship
that exists between a parliament and a minister. The inevitable-yet-regrettable
feeling that comes with the tension inherent in knowingly dismissing a competent
agent is well expressed by the Financial Times when commenting on the dismissal
of the then British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in 1982. The Argentinian
invasion of the disputed Falkland Islands had made clear that his attempt at a
diplomatic solution to the Falkland crisis had failed. The newspaper commented
that [t]he resignation of Lord Carrington is deeply regrettable as regrettable as
the events which left him with no other honourable course. He has been a notable
Foreign Secretary, and has earned the highest regard internationally9, and [i]n the
public eye he was perhaps the most successful British Foreign Minister since the
war.10 ;11
2 Related Literature
Our analysis contributes to the literature on boards of directors. In their survey
article, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 8) observe that the empirical literature
on boards in public corporations is fairly well developed, while theory is still in its
infancy. Stiles and Taylor (2001), when surveying the literature on boards, reach
the same conclusion as to the dearth of theory. The paper most closely related to
ours is Hermalin (2005). He models how a board selects a candidate for an executive
position, forms an impression of the executives ability, and decides whether to retain
9See Lexis Nexis, After Lord Carringtonin The Financial Times, April 6, 1982, p.14.
10See Lexis Nexis, The Resignation of Lord Carringtonin The Financial Times, April 6, 1982,
p.15.
11The South-Korean Hwang Woo-Suk, who was heralded as the worlds leading stem-cell re-
searcherand was a national heromay well have fallen prone to the same pressure to show his
ability. He falsied data used in a Science publication in 2005. He was forced to resign in December
2005 (The Economist (2005, 2006))
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or replace him. Two important di¤erences with our paper should be mentioned.
First, Hermalin focuses on a single role of the board, screening executivesabilities.
Second, the impression of the executives ability is based on, say, presentations and
interactions in board meetings, but not on observed organizational performance.
As a result, the board does not have to reconcile conicting goals. Graziano and
Luporini (2003) model the same selection and retention-dismissal decision. As a
board may erroneously hire an incompetent executive at the selection stage, it may
be hesitant in the evaluation stage to dismiss the executive as this would signal its
own lack of competence and possibly trigger its own replacement due to a takeover.
We come back to some other related literature in the conclusion.
In our paper, the board uses a retention contract to deal with the moral hazard
problem of the executive, analogous to the electorate using its re-election strategy
to discipline politicians in political agency models. As far as we know, it is the rst
time that this analogy is exploited in the literature on corporate governance. As
in the political agency literature, the contracts we consider are implicit, and are
not enforced by some third party. They constitute expectations that are shared
among the principal (board, electorate, or parliament) and the agent (executive,
parliament or minister) about the situations in which an incumbent agent is retained
or dismissed.12 Much of our analysis amounts to the determination of the optimal
implicit contract. As noted above, such contracts could be considered norms. We
argue that this (implicit contract) approach is also useful to understand certain
aspects of the relationship between a board of directors and its top executives. After
all, just as it is hard to gauge the contribution of, say, a minister of foreign a¤airs to
the well-being of a country it is also hard to pin down a top executives contribution
12See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000). Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) were the rst to
argue that the power to replace agents disciplines agents who are inclined to use o¢ ce as a means
of pursuing their own goals.
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to the long-term protability or survival of his organization. What is typically much
easier to observe is whether a minister or top executive has become active: whether
an agreement has been signed, a re-organization started, or a strategy implemented.
Furthermore, just as a parliament does not write an explicit contract specifying
when a minister will be dismissed, a typical board does not stipulate in a contract
what triggers the ousting of an executive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the
model. In Section 4 and 5, we establish the trade-o¤ the board faces between
disciplining and selecting executives. Section 6 discusses how the board shapes the
behaviour of the executive, given that it retains the executive when it does not
observe the value generated by an implemented project. Section 7 discusses how the
board shapes the behaviour of the executive, given that it dismisses the executive
when it does not observe the consequences of an implemented project. In Section
8, we identify the conditions under which the board wants to retain or dismiss the
executive when it does not observe the consequences of an implemented project.
Section 9 concludes.
3 The model
We consider a two-period principal-agent model. There is a pool of agents (execu-
tives), a fraction  of which is competent, while the other executives are incom-
petent. At the beginning of period t = 1, an executive is randomly drawn from this
pool and becomes the incumbent. At the end of period t = 1, the principal (board)
can dismiss the incumbent. If he is dismissed, an executive is randomly drawn from
the pool of executives13 and enters o¢ ce in period t = 2. If the incumbent is not
13We assume that a dismissed period 1 incumbent has no chance of becoming the period 2
incumbent.
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dismissed, he will also hold o¢ ce in period t = 2.
Once the incumbent has been determined for period t 2 f1; 2g, he designs a
project, Xt. We view the value created by this project, Vt, as the addition to the
organizations long term value, relative to business as usual. It depends on (i) the
incumbents competence, and (ii) the state of the world (market circumstances),
t. The random variable t is uniformly distributed over [ h; h]. The executive
knows his competence, and observes t. Once he knows the value of the project, he
can either decide to implement the project (change), Xt = 1, or to maintain the
status quo (business as usual), Xt = 0. An implemented project designed by an
incompetent executive yields a value Vt = VIC (t) = p + t, while an implemented
project designed by a competent executive yields Vt = VC (t) = p + f + t. Of
course, f > 0, implying that on average, or for given market circumstances, a
competent executive designs a better project than an incompetent one. We assume
VC (t =  h) = p+f h < 0. As we will see, this implies that market circumstances
may be so averse that even a competent executive should maintain the status quo.
Similarly, we assume VIC (t = h) = p+ h > 0, implying that market circumstances
may be favourable enough such that an incompetent executive should implement
the project.
Assumption 1 VC (t =  h) < 0 < VIC (t = h).
Information
As mentioned, we assume that the incumbent knows his competence, and that when
making the decision on Xt, he also knows t. The board has limited information
on which it can base its decision to retain or dismiss the incumbent. It knows the
prior probability that a randomly drawn executive is competent, , but it does not
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know his actual level of competence.14 It may learn about an incumbents level of
competence on the basis of the actions the incumbent takes in period one. The board
observes the decision on Xt, but does not always observe whether the executive has
made a good decision. Specically, we assume that (1) if Xt = 0, the board does not
learn what would have been Vt; (2) if Xt = 1, the board learns Vt with probability
; and (3) if Xt = 1, with probability 1   the board remains ignorant about Vt.
Preferences
We model the board as a unitary actor. Its per period payo¤ is XtVt, and its goal
is to maximize the total (two-period) payo¤ by using its retention contract. The
possible retention strategies are discussed in the following sections. The executive
in our model represents a top executive of an organization. He derives utility from
holding o¢ ce power, prestige, visibility, remuneration etc. to which we refer as
benets from holding o¢ ce, . Besides caring about these benets, the executive
also cares to some degree about the value of the implemented project. We assume
that an executives per period payo¤ equals
8><>: XtVt +  if in o¢ ce in period t0 otherwise (1)
The goal of the incumbent in period t = 1 is to maximize his total (two-period)
payo¤ using his implementation decision and given the retention strategy of the
board; the goal of the incumbent in period t = 2 is to maximize period 2 payo¤.
Following the principal-agent literature, we assume that rst the principal sets
the terms of the contract and next the agent determines his optimal behaviour given
14What is essential in our model is that the incumbent is better informed about his level of
competence and the market circumstances than the board.
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those terms. In our case, the board determines under what conditions an executive
is retained or dismissed (the implicit contract), and then the executive decides what
projects to implement.
Timing
Period 1
 Nature determines the type of incumbent, draws 1, and reveals type and 1
to the incumbent, but not to the board.
 The incumbent takes a decision on the project, X1 2 f0; 1g.
 The board observes the decision on X1. If X1 = 1, then with probability 
the board observes V1.
 The board chooses either to keep the incumbent or to replace him.
Period 2
 If the incumbent was replaced in period 1, nature draws a type and reveals it
to the new incumbent, but not to the board.
 Nature draws 2 and reveals it to the incumbent, but not to the board.
 The incumbent takes a decision on the project, X2 2 f0; 1g.
4 The Need for Selection
Suppose that the board does not select an executive on the basis of rst-period
outcomes. Thus, no matter what, the board keeps the rst-period incumbent.15 In
15Alternatively, the principal could always dismiss the agent.
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that case, strategic considerations stemming from the desire to hold o¢ ce play no
role. A project is implemented in period t if and only if its value is positive. Given
the executives ability, the per period payo¤ is maximized. Suppose the incumbent is
competent. Then, Xt = 1 is chosen if and only if VC (t)  0. Given the executives
ability, the per period payo¤ is maximal. Suppose the executive is competent. He
chooses to implement the project if and only if VC (t)  0, or if t   p  f . This
implementation decision yields a per period payo¤ to the board equal to
C = Pr (VC (t)  0)E (VC (t) jVC (t)  0) =
1
4h
(p+ h+ f)2
Similarly, an incompetent executive implements a project if t   p, yielding a
per period prot equal to IC = 14h (p+ h)
2. Clearly, this implies that a board
prefers a competent executive to an incompetent one. We have now arrived at the
drawback of always keeping the executive. Since a competent executive implements
a project in market circumstances in which an incompetent would refrain from doing
so, project implementation (activism) is a signal of competence. Maintaining the
status quo (passivity) is a signal of incompetence. The board could increase its
expected second period payo¤ by dismissing an executive who has maintained the
status quo.
5 Selection induces moral hazard
The previous section shows that when the board always keeps the executive, a
competent executive is more likely to implement a project than an incompetent one
(C < IC). As a result, executive activism signals competence. In this section we
assume that the board selects the second-period incumbent on the basis of the rst-
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period outcome. In line with the signalling function of the implementation decision,
activism is rewarded by retention, whereas an inactive executive is sent home. We
show that this inuences the behaviour of the incumbent in period 1. Activism gives
way to empire building.
Consider a competent executive who has observed 1 in period t = 1.
16 He will
implement the project (rather than reject it) if and only if VC (1)++[C + ]  ,
where here and throughout the paper second-period payo¤s are given in square
brackets. This inequality determines a cut-o¤ value V C () such that the project is
implemented if and only if
VC (1)  V C () :=  C    (2)
Equation (2) says that in period 1 a competent executive is willing to make a loss
on a project in order to remain in o¢ ce. The larger are the benets from holding
o¢ ce  and the larger is the expected value of projects he can generate, the larger
is the loss in value he is willing to accept in the current period.
Similarly, an incompetent executive implements the project if VIC (1) +  +
[IC + ]  . This determines a cut-o¤ value V IC () such that the project is
implemented if and only if
VIC (1)  V IC () :=  IC    (3)
A comparison of (2) and (3) shows that a competent executive implements projects
for lower values of V1. Furthermore, for a given value of 1, VC (1) > VIC (1).
Implementation is therefore more likely with a competent than with an incompetent
16Of course, as the game ends after period 2, the second-period incumbent chooses X2 = 1 if
and only if the expected project payo¤ is positive.
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executive.
How active does a board want an incumbent to be? That is, how much project
value is the board willing to sacrice in period 1 to nd out the level of competence of
an incumbent? If the incumbent does not implement a project, he will be replaced by
an executive of unknown or averagequality. The expected payo¤ this replacement
generates is  := C + (1  )IC . To keep a competent incumbent the board is
willing to pay a price equal to the di¤erence in expected prot C    > 0. Let
V BC :=   (C   ) < 0 denote the maximal rst-period loss the board is willing to
accept. Therefore, the board accepts that a competent incumbent implements some
loss generating projects, but also nds that a competent incumbent becomes overly
active, as V C () < V
B
C . That is, the incumbents activism consists of both signalling,
which serves the board, and empire building, which hurts her. Analogously, the
board is willing to pay a price to nd out an incumbent is incompetent. The board
is willing to give up prot in period one if this leads to the incumbents replacement
by an executive of average quality. Ideally a board wants an incompetent incumbent
to implement a project if and only if VIC (1)  V BIC :=    IC > 0. Of course,
V IC () < V
B
IC , implying that an incompetent incumbent also becomes too active.
Figure 1 illustrates our analysis so far. Panel A (C) shows what decision would
be best from the perspective of the board in case of a competent (incompetent)
executive. Panels B (D) shows the range of values of V1 for which a competent
(incompetent) executive decides to implement the project or to maintain the status
quo. The desire to hold o¢ ce widens the range of parameters for which X1 = 1. The
board does not want (i) a competent executive to chooseX1 = 1 if V1 2 [V C () ; V BC );
nor (ii) an incompetent executive to choose X1 = 1 if V1 2 [V IC () ; V BIC).
In comparison with always keeping the executive, the benet of keeping the ex-
ecutive only if he has implemented a project is an increase in expected payo¤ in
16
the second period. This stems from the signalling function of the rst-period imple-
mentation decision. In practice, the quality of executives improves. The downside
of keeping the executive only if he has implemented a project, however, is that he
distorts the implementation decision. Selecting on the basis of outcomes leads to
a moral hazard problem. In practice, executives become empire builders (see, e.g.,
Baumol (1959), Williamson (1974), and Jensen (1986)).
0=X 1=X
( )hVC -=1m BCV ( )hVC =1m
A
0=X 1=X
( )hVC -=1m ( )l*CV ( )hVC =1m
B
0=X 1=X
( )hVIC -=1m BICV ( )hVIC =1m
C
0=X 1=X
( )hVIC -=1m ( )l*ICV ( )hVIC =1m
D
0=V
Figure 1
It is also clear from Figure 1, parts B and D, that the implementation of value-
destroying projects may result from both competent and incompetent executives.
The often assumed tie between bad performance and incompetent management is
broken because the board faces two tasks, both disciplining and screening.
So far we have focused on two extreme possible strategies for the board. How-
ever, as the board occasionally observes the project value, V1, it may condition its
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decision to keep the executive not merely on a project being implemented, but also
on information on the project value. By keeping the executive only if the value
of the project exceeds a threshold value, V1 > a, the board may discipline17 the
executive, that is, reduce the executives incentive to distort the implementation
decision. What remains to be decided is what to do in case the project is imple-
mented, but the projects value remains unknown. In the next section, we assume
the retention contract no news is good news: the board keeps the executive if it
observes implementation but does not observe the project value. In Section 7, we
assume no news is bad news. The executive is replaced if the board does not ob-
serve the project value. A remark on terminology is in order. We use threshold value
when discussing the boards retention contract, and cuto¤ value when discussing the
executives implementation strategy.
6 Retention Contract 1: No news is good news
Under retention contract 1 the board
 dismisses the executive in case no project has been implemented,
 dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1  a,
 keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and does not
observe V1
 keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 > a.
17This is the expression used by Mace (1971), see the introduction.
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Our main concern is the determination of the threshold value a that is optimal
from the boards point of view. The choice of a determines the degree to which an
executive is disciplined and also the likelihood that a competent executive is selected
for the second period.
To see how the boards choice of a may a¤ect the executives implementation
decision in period 1, consider panels B and D in Figure 1. Suppose that the board
chooses a 2 [V C () ; V IC ()). Then, in case the incumbent is competent, his decision
on X1 may be a¤ected by a. If the board observes V1  a, X1 = 1 leads to dismissal.
Hence, compared to the situation of the previous section, in which X1 = 1 always
leads to keeping the executive, the incentive to choose X1 = 1 is weakened. If the
executive in o¢ ce in period 1 is incompetent, a 2 [V C () ; V IC ()) does not a¤ect his
implementation decision, as a is nonbinding. Now suppose that the board chooses
a  V IC (). Then, a is binding for both a competent and an incompetent executive.
Relative to (2) and (3), the incentive to choose X1 = 1 is weakened.
The upshot is that the boards choice of a amounts to choosing between two
alternatives. First, by choosing a 2 [V C () ; V IC ()), the board chooses to discipline
competent executives, taking for granted that if an incompetent executive is in o¢ ce,
the implementation decision will be distorted, see (3). Second, by choosing a 
V IC (), the board a¤ects the implementation decision of either type of executive.
We now rst derive how the choice of a inuences the behaviour of either type of
executive in isolation.
6.1 Case 1: disciplining a competent executive
Ideally, the board wants a competent incumbent to choose X1 = 1 if and only if
V1 > V
B
C . However, a competent executive chooses X1 = 1 if V1  V C (), see (2).
By using a threshold value a in his retention contract, the board can discipline the
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executive. We say that an executive is fully disciplinedif he no longer distorts the
implementation decision at all, while an executive is said to be partially disciplined
if the distortion is merely reduced. Let bVC denote the cut-o¤ value used by a
competent incumbent if the board sets a su¢ ciently large. Notice that to have
an e¤ect on a competent executives implementation decision, the board should set
a  bVC . Thus, assume a  bVC . Now suppose that a competent executive observes
VC (1) < a. He will implement the project if VC (1) + + [(1  ) (C + )]  .
Hence, the executive implements the project if
VC (1)  bVC () :=   (1  )C   (1  ) (4)
Four remarks are in order. First, for V1 2
hbVC () ; ai the executive chooses im-
plementation in the hope that the board does not observe the project outcome, so
that he keeps o¢ ce. Second, the board can change the value of a without a¤ect-
ing the cuto¤ value used by the executive as long as it sets the threshold value
a such that a  bVC (). Third, a comparison between (2) and (4) shows that
V C () < bVC (). Hence, the executive is at least partially disciplined. Fourth, for
 <  := 1
1  (C   ) the cuto¤ value would satisfy V BC < bVC (). This means
that if the competent executive cares little about holding o¢ ce, the e¤ect of setting
a threshold may be too strong: the benecial screening function of the implemen-
tation decision is hampered. But this also implies that for  < , the board can
induce the executive to use V BC as his threshold value by setting a = V
B
C . This
e¤ectively stops the executive from distorting the implementation decision.
Lemma 1 Suppose the retention contract no news is good news. If  < , then
a = V BC is the unique threshold value that guarantees that a competent executive
is fully disciplined. If these conditions do not jointly hold, then the board can only
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partially discipline a competent executive, by setting a  bVC (). The cut-o¤ value
used by the disciplined executive is
bVC =
8><>: V
B
C if  < 

bVC () =   (1  )C   (1  ) otherwise (5)
with bVC 2 (V C () ; V BC ].18
6.2 Case 2: disciplining an incompetent executive
We now turn to the possibility that the board sets the threshold value a such that
the behaviour of an incompetent executive is a¤ected, a > V IC ().
Lemma 2 Suppose the retention contract no news is good news. It is not possi-
ble to fully discipline an incompetent executive. An incompetent executive can be
partially disciplined by setting a  bVIC () =   (1  )IC   (1  ). Then, the
board induces an incompetent executive to choose X1 = 1 if and only if V1  bVIC (),
where bVIC () 2 (V IC () ; 0).
Proof. Suppose a is such that the incompetent executives implementation strat-
egy is a¤ected (ie., a > V IC ()). Clearly, for VIC (1)  a, the project will be imple-
mented. For VIC (1) < a, implementation yields VIC (1) + + [(1  ) (IC + )],
while maintaining the status quo yields . It is now straightforward to check that
X1 = 1 is preferred to X1 = 0 if VIC (1)  bVIC () =   (1  )IC   (1  ),
where V IC () < bVIC () < 0. As a result, disciplining is partial, not full.
Lemma 2 states that, contrary to the case where the incumbent is competent,
the board can never fully discipline an incompetent executive. The reason is as
18If  < , the disciplined executive implements the project if and only if V1 > V BC . Hence, to
be precise, the cut-o¤ value should be lim
"#0
V BC + ".
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follows. Activism is a prerequisite for continuing in o¢ ce. This condition induces
an incumbent to implement projects that generate losses. The introduction of the
threshold dampens the incentive to do so. However, ideally the board wants an
incompetent incumbent to refrain from implementing even some prot-generating
projects. This ideal cannot be attained.
6.3 Choice of threshold value a
Above we have analysed the e¤ect of a threshold value a on the behaviour of each
type of incumbent in isolation. We now analyse how the choice of a inuences
the boards utility. To do so, we look both at the e¤ect of the choice of a on the
discipline exerted in the rst period and on the likelihood that a competent executive
is selected for the second period.
Proposition 1 Suppose the retention contract no news is good news. The board
has two options. It either disciplines a competent executive as much as possible (be
it fully or partially) by setting a = bVC. Or it disciplines both types of executive by
setting a 2 [bVIC () ; VIC (1 = h)].
The Proposition follows, to a large extent, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. There-
fore, we only provide an informal proof of the Proposition. To grasp the basic ideas
behind Proposition 1 consider Figure 2.
Figure 2 describes a situation where bVC < V IC ().19 Suppose that the board
sets a < V IC (). The implication is that the board sets a so as to inuence the
behaviour of a competent executive, taking for granted that an incompetent exec-
utives implementation decision is based on V IC (). In Section 5 we have argued
19If V IC ()  bVC , then the boards dominant strategy is to discipline also the incompetent
executive. In this case setting a = bVC also a¤ects the behavior of an incompetent executive.
Hence, disciplining only a competent executive is not an option.
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that, given that the board does not know the executives ability, ideally it wants a
competent executive to choose implementation only if V1 > V BC . Lemma 1 states
that if  < , the board can reach this goal by setting a = V BC : a competent
incumbent can be fully disciplined. If instead   , the board can only partially
discipline a competent executive, bVC () < V BC , by setting a  bVC (). Has the
board an incentive to set a > bVC (), rather than a = bVC ()? The answer is in
the negative. When the board observes that V1 2
hbVC () ; V IC(), it knows the
incumbent is competent. The incumbent executive should be kept.
0=X 1=X
( )hVC -=1m CBC VV ?= ( )hVC =1m( )l*CV
0=V
0=X 1=X
( )hVIC -=1m BICV ( )hVIC =1m( )l*ICV ( )lICV?
Figure 2
Now suppose that the board sets a  bVIC (). Then, the board disciplines
an incompetent executive, and since bVC < bVIC (), it also disciplines a competent
executive. Thus, by choosing a  bVIC (), the board maximally uses the disciplining
possibilities within the no news is good newscontract. Notice that if the board
observes a value V1 2 [bVC ; bVIC ()), it is aware that the executive is competent, but
nevertheless dismisses him. The price of a contract that disciplines an incompetent
executive is that the possibilities for selecting a competent executive are not fully
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exploited. At which value should the board set a? Recall from Section 5 that ideally
the board wants an incompetent executive to choose implementation if VIC (1) 
V BIC . However, as Lemma 2 states, within the no news is good news contract
the board cannot fully discipline an incompetent executive. The best it can do
is to partially discipline an incompetent executive by setting a  bVIC (). Does
the board have an incentive to set a > bVIC (), rather than a = bVIC ()? For
a 2
hbVIC () ; VIC (1 = h)i, the value of a has no e¤ect on the implementation
decision of either type of executive, nor on selection. The board should not set a >
VIC (1 = h), as V1 > VIC (1 = h) is clear evidence that the executive is competent.
The upshot is as follows. Recall that equating project implementation and reten-
tion induces the executive to become overly active. The board can use information
on the value of implemented projects that occasionally becomes available to condi-
tion its retention decision. The contract no news is good newso¤ers two options
for a board to guide the behaviour of an executive. First, the board can focus on
disciplining a competent executive only (a = bVC). We refer to this option as the
selection option, as this option maximally exploits the selection possibilities. Sec-
ond, the board can focus on disciplining an incompetent executive and thereby also
on disciplining a competent executive (a = bVIC ()). We refer to this option as the
disciplining option. The benet of the selection option is a higher probability that in
period two the incumbent will be competent. This probability is directly related to
the length of the interval
hbVC ; V IC ()i, see Figure 2. The benet of the disciplining
option is that an incompetent executive distorts the implementation decision less.
This benet depends positively on the length of the interval
h
V IC () ; bVIC ()i.
One important question remains: Which option does the board choose? Propo-
sition 2 describes how the answer to this question depends on the parameters of the
model.
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Proposition 2 Suppose bVC < V IC(). Then, an increase in  or , or a decrease in
f , widens the range of parameters for which the board chooses the disciplining option,
rather than the selection option. If instead V IC ()  bVC, the boards dominant
strategy is to choose the disciplining option by setting a = bVIC ().
Proof : Appendix
Clearly, if V IC ()  bVC , then the board chooses the disciplining option. The
reason is that in that case, if the board were to choose a = bVC , it would also a¤ect
an incompetent executives behaviour. Therefore, disciplining a competent executive
only, the selection option, is not a real option. Another way of looking at this result
is that, as discussed earlier, the benet of the selection option is directly related to
the length of the interval [a; V IC ()]. Obviously, if V

IC ()  a, then there is no
benet of the selection option.
Now suppose that bVC < V IC (), so that the board really can choose between
the selection and disciplining option. To determine how a change in the parameters
a¤ects the boards choice as to the two options, we compare the e¤ects of such a
change on the lengths of the intervals
hbVC ; V IC ()i and hV IC () ; bVIC ()i. We focus
on the situation where    (and so bVC = bVC ()20). It is easy to show that
V IC ()  bVC =  IC     (  (1  )C   (1  )) (6)
= (C   IC)  C   
20The analysis of the case  <  with bVC = V BC is analogous.
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and
bVIC ()  V IC () =   (1  )IC   (1  )  ( IC   ) (7)
= IC + 
The larger is the value of (6), the more attractive is the selection option. In contrast,
the larger is the value of (7), the more attractive is the disciplining option.
An increase in benets from holding o¢ ce  decreases the value the board at-
taches to the selection option, see (6), and increases the value of the disciplining
option, see (7). The reason for this result is clear. As explained in Section 5, the
executives desire to hold o¢ ce is the reason the board wants to discipline in the
rst place.
In our model, the board wants a competent, rather than an incompetent, ex-
ecutive to design a project. It is therefore hardly surprising that an increase in f ,
through its e¤ect on C , widens the range of parameters for which the board chooses
the selection option.
An increase in  implies that the probability that the board learns the project
outcome increases. Important for the e¤ect of  on the choice between the selection
and disciplining option is that the possibility of observing V is a prerequisite for
disciplining executives. It is therefore quite intuitive that a rise in  increases the
attractiveness of the disciplining option. This is borne out by the fact that the value
of the disciplining option, (7), increases in . By the same token, the value of the
selection option, (6), goes down as a higher likelihood of the project value being
observed reduces a competent executives eagerness to implement.
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7 Retention contract 2: No news is bad news
Under retention contract 2 the board
 dismisses the executive in case no project has been implemented,
 dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 < a,
 dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and does not
observe V1
 keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1  a.
Notice that the main di¤erence between contracts 1 and 2 resides in the boards
decision in case it does not observe the value of an implemented project. With
contract 1, the executive is kept in o¢ ce. This makes sense from a selection per-
spective. After all, a competent executive is more likely to implement a project than
an incompetent one. It has the disadvantage of inducing the incumbent to distort
the implementation decision as he hopes a project of low value will go unnoticed.
Retention contract 2 dashes any such hopes. By dismissing the incumbent in case
activism does not lead to any visible results, it becomes easy to discipline the in-
cumbent. However, it still is the case that a competent executive is more likely
to implement a project than an incompetent one. The consequence is that in the
absence of visible results, the board is more likely to send home a competent than
an incompetent executive.
Consider the executives behaviour if the board retains him if and only if he
implements a project and the projects payo¤ becomes visible. Suppose the in-
cumbent is competent. He implements a project of value VC (1) if and only if
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VC (1) + + [ (C + )]   or if
VC (1)  eVC () :=  C    (8)
An incompetent incumbent implements a project if and only if
VIC (1)  eVIC () :=  IC    (9)
Note that eVC () < eVIC (). As in the previous section, a competent incumbent opts
for X1 = 1 for more values of V1 and therefore of 1 than an incompetent incumbent.
We will now argue that the no news is bad newsrule allows for a lower degree
of screening than no news is good news. The advantage of the retention contract
no news is bad newsis that it gives weaker incentives to executives to distort the
implementation decision. Recall that in case project implementation is su¢ cient
to retain o¢ ce, the threshold value the board would like the competent incumbent
to use equals V BC =   (C   ) (and V BIC =    IC in case of an incompetent
incumbent). In the previous section, we analysed the extent to which the use of a
cut o¤ value in its retention strategy allowed the board to induce an incumbent to
use this threshold value. In case retention requires both activism and information
about the value of the implemented project a competent incumbent is sent home
with probability 1  if he implements a project. As a result, given a retention rule
that requires information about the value of projects the board is now less willing
to accept a rst-period loss. Analogously, the board is now less willing to forego
a protable project in period one to nd out that the incumbent is incompetent:
with probability 1    the incumbent would have been replaced anyway. Hence,
eV BC =   (C   ) and eV BIC =  (   IC). As the ideal thresholds have moved
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closer (eV BIC   eV BC < V BIC   V BC ), there is less room for screening in case news about
the project value becomes an additional criterion for retention. On the other hand,
the incumbents inclination to distort the implementation decision has declined (
in (8) and (9) instead of  in (2) and (3)).
If the board uses the no news is bad newsretention contract, it can fully disci-
pline a competent executive, independent of the degree to which an executive derives
benets from holding o¢ ce.
Lemma 3 Suppose no news is bad news. The board can fully discipline a compe-
tent executive by setting a = eV BC . A competent executive then uses the cut-o¤ valueeV BC .
Proof : Consider a project with VC (1) < eV BC . Implementation leads to a
project loss (as eV BC < 0), and dismissal in period 1. Maintaining the status quo
is better as the project loss is foregone. Now suppose VC (1)  eV BC . Implemen-
tation yields VC (1) +  + [ (C + )] whereas maintaining the status quo yields
. Implementation is best if the condition VC (1)   C    holds. Because
 C    < eV BC and we are analysing the case where eV BC  VC (1) the condition
holds. QED
Now consider the case that the board wants to discipline an incompetent execu-
tive, a 2
eVIC () ; VIC (1 = h)i. It can at most partially discipline an incompetent
executive. As with retention contract 1, if it decides to discipline an incompetent
executive, it also disciplines a competent executive.
Lemma 4 Suppose no news is bad news. If the board decides to discipline an in-
competent executive, its (weakly) dominant strategy is to set a = 0, thereby inducing
both types of executive to implement only protable projects in period 1.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. By setting a 2
heVIC () ; 0, the
board induces either type of executive to implement a project only if V1  a. By
setting a 2 [0; VIC (1 = h)], it induces either type of executive to implement only
protable projects, V1  0. As in either case both types of executives use the same
implementation strategy, a change in a leaves the likelihood of selecting a competent
executive una¤ected. The best the board can do is to induce either type of executive
to implement only protable projects. This can be guaranteed by setting a = 0.21
Whether the board wants to discipline the competent executive only (the selec-
tion option) or both types of executive (the disciplining option) is described in the
next proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose no news is bad news. If eVIC () > eV BC , the board has two
options. It either chooses the selection option by setting a = eV BC , or it chooses the
disciplining option by setting a = 0. An increase in , or a decrease in f widens
the range of parameters for which the board chooses the disciplining option. The
parameter  does not a¤ect the choice of option. If instead eVIC ()  eV BC , the
boards dominant strategy is to choose the disciplining option by setting a = 0.
Proof : Appendix
As under the retention contract no news is good news, the boards choice of a
under no news is bad newsis a choice between putting emphasis on disciplining
or selecting. For instance, an increase in benets  strengthens executivesincen-
tives to distort the implementation decision. Therefore, an increase in  makes the
disciplining option more important (choose a = 0). In contrast, the higher is f ,
the more important it is that a competent executive keeps o¢ ce. Consequently, the
21To be precise, the board can choose any a 2 [0; VIC (1 = h)], whence a = 0 being a weakly
dominant strategy, see Lemma 4. In what follows we will ignore the other weakly dominant
strategies a 2 (0; VIC (1 = h)].
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higher is f , the more the board would like to emphasize the selection function of
the retention contract (choose a = eV BC ).
Qualitatively, Proposition 3 only di¤ers from Proposition 2 in the e¤ects of .
The reason is that under the retention contract no news is good newsan increase in
 facilitates disciplining an incumbent. However, under no news is bad news, the
board can always discipline the incumbent. Consequently, under the latter retention
contract,  does not inuence the choice between the two options concerning a.
8 The Two Retention Contracts Compared
Boards of directors perform two main functions. They inuence what top executives
consider acceptable actions, and they screen incumbents with a view to retaining
competent ones and dismissing incompetent ones. We have argued that within a
retention contract or norm the board faces a trade-o¤ between increasing the likeli-
hood of selecting a competent executive on the one hand, and weakening executives
incentives to distort the implementation decision on the other hand. Essentially the
same trade-o¤ exists when comparing the e¤ectiveness of the two retention norms.
The main di¤erence between the two norms is the boards reaction to an executive
who has implemented an important project the outcomes of which are not known
yet. From a narrow selection point of view, the boards adequate reaction is to keep
the executive. As shown in Section 3, it is more likely that a project is implemented
by an executive who is competent than incompetent. Thus, a benet of no news
is good newsis that in case of no news the executive is retained. This improves
the expected quality of projects implemented in the second period. However, from
a disciplining perspective, the board benets from announcing and sticking to a
no news is bad newsnorm, as it reduces an executives incentive to distort the
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implementation decision.
It is now easy to determine which type of retention norm performs better de-
pending on the value of . For small values of , executives hardly have incentives
to distort the implementation decision. The implication is that for small values of
 the retention contract no news is bad newsis relatively unattractive. It scores
badly on selecting, while the benets of disciplining are small. More generally, one
can show that if  is smaller than a certain threshold  < L, then the board prefers
no news is good newsto no news is bad news. The opposite holds for very high
values of . Lemma 1 and 2 show that with no news is good newsand very high
values of , both competent and incompetent executives virtually always implement
the project in period 1. Clearly, disciplining is then desired. By choosing no news
is bad newswith a = 0 the board assures that only protable projects are imple-
mented. One can show that if  is su¢ ciently high  > H , then the board prefers
no news is bad newsto no news is good news.
For moderate values of , the relative performance of the two retention norms
is less clear. All parameters play a role. Numerical analysis suggests that a rise in
f always makes no news is good newsa more attractive choice. The di¤erence in
prot increases in f . This di¤erence is the reason for having a selection procedure
before period two. It is therefore quite intuitive that an increase in this di¤erence
makes the retention contract focusing on selection relatively more attractive. An
increase in , the likelihood with which the value of the project becomes known
before the board decides on retention, also makes the choice for no news is good
newsmore appealing. The reason is that an increase in  lowers the cost (distortion
of the implementation decision) of the no news is good newsretention contract.
Apart from how the parameters of the model a¤ect the choice between the two
retention contracts, another feature of the retention contracts is worth emphasizing.
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In the introduction, we have discussed examples of top executives who were acknowl-
edged as competent, but who were nevertheless dismissed. Our model provides an
explanation. First consider the no news is good newsretention contract. Suppose
that within this contract the board chooses the disciplining option, a¤ecting the
implementation decision of either type of executive. Then, as argued in Section 6, a
competent executive chooses implementation for a wider range of parameters than
an incompetent executive. Consequently, when the board observes that the project
outcome falls in this range, it can infer that the executive is competent. Never-
theless, it will dismiss him. The reason is that following a strict retention contract
weakens executivesincentives to distort the implementation decision. Occasionally
dismissing competent executives is the price the board has to pay for discipline. Un-
der the no news is bad newsretention contract a similar phenomenon exists. Again,
a competent executive chooses implementation for a wider range of parameters than
an incompetent one. This result is independent of the choice of the board between
only disciplining the competent executive and disciplining either type of executive.
Hence, implementation signals competence. Therefore, dismissing, rather than re-
taining, an executive when a project has been implemented but outcomes remain
unobserved makes it quite probable that the dismissed executive is competent.
9 Conclusion
Boards of directors have limited information that can be used to discipline and
screen the top executives of their companies. In this paper we have analysed a
simple model that shows the dilemmas that result. The desire to screen executives
to improve the future wellbeing of the organization induces executives to become
overly active to show their credentials. The board can counter this tendency by
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dismissing an executive whose projects are proven to destroy value. Besides, it can
decide to replace the incumbent if it knows that a project has been implemented,
but its results remain as yet unobserved. Either decision will reduce the temptation
to implement loss-generating projects. But unfortunately, if it decides to dismiss
the incumbent on either ground, the board can deduce that the expected quality of
the incoming executive will be lower than that of the incumbent who is forced to
leave. We have shown under what circumstances one retention contract is preferred
over another.
Mace (1971) noticed that only in case of repeatedly observed bad performance is
an executive ousted. One way of interpreting this nding is that, by and large, the
parameter values in the real world are such that boards prefer a no news is good
newsretention norm. After all, if executives identify themselves with the wellbeing
of their company, or if it is very hard to nd a capable executive that could replace
the current one, no news is good news is the more adequate norm. There may
be other reasons for the pattern observed by Mace. First, note that if the board
follows this norm, it does not face a dilemma in case the benets of a project are still
unknown: the incumbent stays and this is best from a screening perspective. For a
board that does not want to upset amiable relations with the executive, this norm
granting the executive the benet of the doubt may well be preferred to no news is
bad news. Second, a board that uses a no news is bad newscontract may induce
executives to focus on projects and investments that generate visible results quickly.
This short-termism may pose a threat to the long-term viability of the organization.
We did not discuss this possibility, but it should not be hard to integrate it into
the current set-up. Third, in our modelling approach we see the executive as the
agent, and the board as its principal, albeit a badly informed one. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) argue that it may be better to replace this approach by one in
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which an executive inuences the composition of the board and negotiates about its
pay. The better the executive performed in the past, the more leeway he will have.
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that a managerial power approach to the relation
between a board and an executive should complement the standard principal-agent
approach. Again, board members who are selected by the top executive and who
enjoy substantial pay and prestige because of their position are unlikely to rock
the boatand come into action unless some egregious and obvious problem cannot
be denied any longer. Future research that aims at integrating retention strategies
as used in the current paper and a bargaining or managerial power approach seems
to be a worthwhile undertaking.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 2 does two things. First, it splits the pa-
rameter space into two subspaces, one in which a principals dominant strategy is
to discipline an agent irrespective of his type (V IC ()  bVC), and one in which
the principal sometimes chooses the selection option and sometimes the disciplining
option (V IC () > bVC). Second, for V IC () > bVC , the proposition provides com-
parative statics results on the threshold value of  that determines whether the
principal uses the selection option or the disciplining option. In the main text the
conditions determining the subspaces are derived. So, what remains to be proven
are the comparative statics results.
To derive these results, we distinguish two cases. First, for  < , the principal
can fully discipline the competent agent. Second, for   , the principal can only
partially discipline the competent agent.
Comparative statics results for  < .
We rst determine the threshold value 1 for which the principal is indi¤erent be-
tween using the screening option or the disciplining option.
Suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a = V BC , implying that
a competent agent implements the project i¤ V1 > V BC and an incompetent agent
implements the project i¤V1  V IC (). Then the principals expected utility equals
   1
4h


 
V BC
2
+ (1  ) (V IC ())2

+

 +
 (1  )
2h
 
f + V IC ()  V BC

(C   IC)

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Substituting V IC () (see (4)) and V
B
C (see p. 16) and rewriting gives
   (1  )
4h
 
 (1  ) (C   IC)2 + ( IC   )2

+

 +
 (1  )
2h
(f   IC   + (1  ) (C   IC)) (C   IC)

(10)
Now suppose the principal chooses the disciplining option and sets a 2
hbVIC () ; VIC (1 = h)i,
implying that a competent agent implements the project i¤ V1  bVC () and an in-
competent agent implements the project i¤ V1  bVIC (). Then the expected utility
to the principal equals
   1
4h


bVC ()2 + (1  )bVIC ()2
+

 +
 (1  )
2h

f + (1  )
bVIC ()  bVC () (C   IC)
Substituting bVIC () (see lemma 2) and bVC () (see (5)) and rewriting gives
   (1  )
2
4h
 
 ( C   )2 + (1  ) ( IC   )2

+

 +
 (1  )
2h
 
f + (1  )2 (C   IC)

(C   IC)

(11)
Now the choice between the selection option and the disciplining option amounts to
a comparison between (10) and (11). The principal chooses the selection option i¤
 < 1 =   + (C   IC)
s
 (1  )  (2  )
( (2  )  ) (12)
where 1 is the value of  at which the principal is indi¤erent between disciplin-
ing only the competent agent and disciplining either type of agent. Notice that
 (2  )   must be larger than 0. If  (2  )    0, then the principal always
chooses the selection option. In this situation, the selection option always yields a
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higher utility than the disciplining option.
We are now ready to determine the e¤ect of , f ,  and  on the choice between
the selection option and the disciplining option.
 An increase in  widens the range of parameters for which the principal chooses
to discipline either type of agent. This result follows directly from (12).
 The higher is the parameter f , the less attractive is the disciplining option.
An increase in f , has a positive e¤ect on 1
@1
@f
=
@C
@f
 
 +
s
 (1  )  (2  )
( (2  )  )
!
> 0,
where @C
@f
= p+f+h
2h
. To prove that @1
@f
is positive, we must show thatq
(1 )(2 )
((2 ) ) > . Dene t () := (1  2)  (2  )+2. The inequality holds
if t () > 0 for all . Now observe that because of  <  (2  ), it follows
that @t=@ < 0. Furthermore, t ( (2  )) =  (2  ) (1   (2  )) > 0 for
 2 (0; 1), and so t () > 0 for all .
 The higher is the parameter , the more attractive is the disciplining option.
First, note that an increase in , narrows the range of parameters for which
the principal always chooses selection ( @
@
( (2  )  ) = 2 (1  ) > 0).
Second, if  (2  )   > 0 an increase in  has a negative e¤ect on 1.
@1
@
=
  (1  ) (1  ) 2 (C   IC)
( (2  )  (1  )) 12 ( (2  )  ) 32
< 0
Comparative statics results for   
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To derive the comparative static results in case   , we again have to compare
the principals expect utility if she chooses the selection option and the principals
expected utility if she chooses the disciplining option. In the previous case we have
already determined the expected utility if the principal chooses the disciplining
option. So, let us now determine the principals expected utility if she chooses
the selection option. This means that (i) the principal sets a = bVC (), (ii) a
competent agent implements the project i¤ V1  bVC (), and (iii) an incompetent
agent implements the project i¤ V1  V IC (). The principals expected utility then
equals
   1
4h


bVC ()2 + (1  ) (V IC ())2+
 +
 (1  )
2h

f + V IC ()  bVC () (C   IC)
Filling in the values of bVC () (see (5)) and V IC () (see (4)) and rewriting gives
   1
4h
 
 (1  )2 ( C   )2 + (1  ) ( IC   )2

+

 +
 (1  )
2h
(f   IC + (1  )C   ) (C   IC)

(13)
The choice between the selection option and the disciplining option amounts to
comparing (13) and (11). The principal chooses the selection option if
 < 2 =
1
2  

    (1  )IC + (C   IC)
p
2 (1  ) (2  ) + 2

(14)
We can now determine the e¤ect of , f ,  and  on the choice between selection
and disciplining.
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 An increase in  widens the range of parameters for which the principal chooses
to discipline either type of agent, rather than only disciplining a competent
agent. This result follows directly from (14).
 The higher is f , the less attractive is the disciplining option. An increase in
f , has a positive e¤ect on 2.
@2
@f
=
1
2  
@C
@f

 +
p
2 (1  ) (2  ) + 2

> 0
where @C
@f
= p+f+h
2h
. To prove that @2
@f
is positive, we must show thatp
2 (1  ) (2  ) + 2 > . Rewriting this expression we nd that the in-
equality holds if 2 (1  ) (2  ) + 2 > 2 or if 2 (1  ) (2  ) > 0. The
latter inequality is satised as  2 (0; 1).
 The e¤ect of an increase in  on 2 is ambiguous. We can distinguish two
opposite e¤ects.
@2
@
=
1
2  
 
  (C   IC) + 1
2
(C   IC) 2 (+ (1  ) (2  ))p
 (2 (1  ) (2  ) + )
!
 The higher is , the more attractive is the disciplining option. An increase in
 has a negative e¤ect on 2.
@2
@
=
(C   IC)
(2  )2
 
 +   (2     ) p
 (2 (1  ) (2  ) + )
!
< 0
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3: Proposition 3 does two things. First, it denes a pa-
rameter space (eVIC ()  eV BC ) for which the principals dominant strategy is to
discipline either type of agent and a parameter space (eVIC () > eV BC ) for which
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the principal can choose between the selection option and the disciplining option.
Second, for eVIC () > eV BC , the proposition gives the comparative statics results.
First, we derive the conditions on the parameter space. If eV BC  eVIC () (that is
  (1  ) (C   IC) IC), setting a = eV BC also a¤ects an incompetent agents
behavior. In this situation disciplining only a competent agent is not a real option.
Therefore, the principals dominant strategy is to discipline either type of agent by
setting a 2 [0; VIC (1 = h)]. If eV BC < eVIC (), then the principal can choose to
discipline only the competent agent or she can discipline either type of agent. What
remains to be proven are the comparative statics results in the last situation.
We rst derive the value of 3 for which expected utility of the principal in case she
chooses the selection option or the disciplining option are the same.
Suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a = eV BC , implying that
a competent agent implements the project i¤ V1  eV BC and an incompetent agent
implements the project i¤V1  eVIC (). Then the principals expected utility equals
   1
4h


eV BC 2 + (1  )eVIC ()2
+

 +
 (1  )
2h

f + eVIC ()  eV BC  (C   IC)
Substituting eVIC () (see (10)) and eV BC (see p. 28) and rewriting gives the following
expression
   (1  ) 
2
4h
 
 (1  ) (C   IC)2 + ( IC   )2

+

 +
 (1  )
2h
(f +  ((1  ) (C   IC)  IC   )) (C   IC)

(15)
Now suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a 2 [0; VIC (1 = h)],
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implying that an agent implements the project i¤ V1  0. Then the principals
expected utility equals
 +

 +
 (1  )
2h
f (C   IC)

(16)
Now the choice between the selection option and the disciplining option can be
analyzed by comparing (15) and (16). The principal prefers the selection option to
the disciplining option if
 < 3 =   + (C   IC)p (17)
where 3 is the value of  for which the principal is indi¤erent between the selection
option and the disciplining option.
Now we can determine how the parameters , f;  and  a¤ect the choice between
selection and disciplining.
 An increase in , widens the range of parameters for which the principal
chooses to discipline either type of agent. This result follows directly from
(17).
 An increase in f , narrows the range of parameters for which the principal
chooses to discipline either type of agent. An increase in f has a positive
e¤ect on 3
@3
@f
=
@C
@f
( +p) > 0
where @C
@f
= p+f+h
2h
.
 The parameter  has no e¤ect on the choice between disciplining the competent
agent only or disciplining either type of agent. An increase in  has no e¤ect
42
on 3 (d3d = 0).
Q.E.D.
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